Editor’s Note: This two-part series has been expanded to three-parts. As noted in my prior column much has been made of then-candidate and now-President Donald Trump’s core supporters—his so-called base. When referring to Trump’s base, reference is to more than merely those who voted for Trump, but those who appear to support him through thick and thin, i.e., those who, in his words, would still vote for him even if he shot someone on 5th Avenue. As best I can determine from the available material, and noted in the prior column, the Trump base has shrunk down to about 24 percent of those who voted for him or have spoken approvingly of him to pollsters. As professional Republican pollster Kristen Anderson reported: “It is around one in four [of people polled] who like his tweeting, like the insults,” which seems something of an index to Trump’s mind and actions. This core group appears to be the base on which Trump’s approval ratings are based, as well, and those numbers have been historically low from the outset of his presidency, and they have been trending downward. According to the Gallup weekly polls, Trump’s job approval started at around 45 percent, but during his first year in office, it was mostly below 40 percent. As a poll-watcher, I also noticed the most recent Washington Post-ABC News polls show that only 11 percent of all Americans think his tweeting is helpful, with only 21 percent of Republicans approve of his tweeting (more evidence of his shrinking base). Trump’s base obviously resides within the collection of voters who supported him at the polls in November 2016. According to a Boston Globe (Nov. 9, 2016) exit poll demographics of the 2016 presidential vote reveal the following (which I have abbreviated for this column):
Before the 2016 general election, much of the polling of potential Trump voters focused on low-earning and little-educated, white, working-class men, suggesting they were his core supporters. But that early polling has proved less than accurate based on the information in the general election exit polling. For example, when the exit poll numbers are further broken down, they show that voters with income over $50,000 (also reported as $50 to $100,000) with Trump winning this bracket 50 percent to Clinton’s 46 percent and he also won the over $100,000 bracket 48 percent to Clinton’s 47 percent. While only 27 percent of the 2016 voters considered their financial situation worse on Election Day 2016 than 2012, Trump overwhelming carried those voters’ 78 percent to Clinton’s 19 percent. In short, it does not appear that financial distress, fear of the future, or immigrants taking their jobs is a common factor uniting Trump’s base. I am not going to explain all the interesting facts that can be gleaned from my chart. I am not a chart spoiler. But it should be noted the 2016 exit poll demographics do suggest that given his 12-point margin over Clinton with men, his base is predominately male. (This may explain his current refusal to show any empathy whatsoever with the women abused by his White House staff—not to mention his disparaging over a dozen women who have accused him sexual improprieties.) News people have been interviewing Trump voters all over the country, and most prominently in West Virginia and Ohio, more specifically areas that had previously voted for Obama that voted overwhelmingly for Trump. While these group sessions are interesting, I find they tell us little about Trump’s base.Fortunately, however, academics have now had the 2016 election data for over a year, and their studies can tell us not just who within the demographic set forth in the chart above are Trump’s base, but WHY they are Trumpian to the end. With these prior article as a preface, I can turn to the findings of these studies, which can now be better understood. (Indeed, I am waiting for one of the major studies to come hot off the press to bring my overview of Trump base to a close, by explaining why people support this most untraditional, norm shattering, president.) Keep abreast of significant corporate, financial and political developments around the world. Stay informed and spot emerging risks and opportunities with independent global reporting, expert commentary and analysis you can trust.
Sean McElwee (@SeanMcElwee) Who is Trump’s base? At first glance, it may seem like an easy question to answer, but in reality the question is quite fraught and presents different paths forward for the Democratic Party. On Twitter, I’ve made the case that white evangelicals should be seen as Trump’s base, but as Data for Progress has noted elsewhere, there’s a reasonable case for considering older affluent whites as Trump’s base. In addition, media analysis has focused on Trump’s appeal to non-college whites and rural whites. So who the hell is Trump’s base? And what is a base? Six groups come to mind:
Which Group Supports Trump The Most? To begin, I analyzed vote choice for each “potential base,” analyzing only validated voters (those that the CCES matched to the voter file as having voted in 2016). As a baseline, 40 percent of whites voted for Clinton, 54 percent for Trump and the rest for someone else. In this analysis, white evangelicals immediately stand out. Nearly four in five white evangelical voters voted for Trump, with net support of +61. No other group comes close to that level of net support, with white rural voters having net support of +32. Thirty-four percent of non-college white voters voted for Clinton and 60 percent voted for Trump. Among over 50s, 37 percent voted for Clinton and 60 percent for Trump. Among white male voters, 37 percent voted for Clinton and 56 percent voted for Trump.
Which Group Makes Up The Biggest Share of Trump Voters? Next, I compared the estimated share of the voting eligible electorate for each group with the share of Trump voters. That is, if a group is 20 percent of the eligible electorate and 25 percent of Trump’s voters, the difference would be +5 (or .05 in the chart below). In absolute terms, evangelicals and non-college voters stand out, but the largest gap is among whites over 50, who make up only 46 percent of the voting eligible electorate but 60 percent of Trump voters. This effect is largely due to their high levels of turnout. When analyzing all voters, non-college whites and white evangelicals still stand out, but the gap among whites over 50 whites shrinks dramatically.
Which Factor Most Predicts Trump Support? To further test this, I ran a series of logistic regressions and calculated the average marginal effect for each demographic characteristic. Multinomial: First, I ran a multinomial logistic regression including three outcomes: Clinton, Trump and another candidate. I then calculated the conditional marginal effect of each variable, which were all coded as binaries for simplicity (i.e. 0 or 1) holding all other variables equal. The chart shows the dramatic result: holding other factors equal, being an evangelical increases the chance a white person will vote for Trump by nearly 40 percentage points. The next closest variable, being non-college, has an effect of nearly 20 percentage points.
Two-way: When I exclude third party voters, we see a similar result.
Only Democrats and Independents: Another way of thinking about Trump’s base may be to analyze which voters separate him from a standard Republican. That is, which voters comprise a uniquely “Trump” base, as opposed to the “Republican” base. To identify “Trump’s” base, I ran the same model, but only among whites who did not identify as Republican.
(Another regression, analyzing whites who recalled voting for Obama, generates a similar plot). Perhaps surprisingly, not only did Trump perform well among evangelicals generally, he appears to have moved some white evangelicals out of the Democratic or Independent column (this fits with exit polls and my analysis of Voter Study Group data). While other groups have moved away from Trump, white evangelicals have moved towards him. Conclusion: White evangelicals account for, depending on the dataset, between 1 in 4 and 1 in 5 voters -- roughly equivalent to the share of the electorate accounted for by people of color. While white evangelicals clock in at net support of +61 for Trump, people of color were +52 pro-Clinton. While non-college whites do indeed make up a significant portion of Trump’s base, they also make up a non-trivial share of Clinton voters. If we define the base as a group making up a non-trivial share of the electorate that overwhelmingly prefers one party, it is fair to call white evangelicals Trump’s base. If we define the base purely by the size of the coalition, we might prefer instead white non-college voters or whites over 50, both of whom make up more than half of Trump’s voters. If we want to analyze specifically “Trump’s” base, or voters that gravitated toward Trump but might not have for a normal Republican candidate, traditional narratives about non-college whites are correct. However, perhaps surprisingly, Trump also converted some white evangelicals who had voted for Obama. The characteristic most likely to be shared by a white person who voted for Trump is non-college status, but this is true of all white voters (the non-college share of the electorate is significantly larger than college). If you want to know one thing that will tell you whether a white person voted for Trump, ask them if they are born again. Sean McElwee (@SeanMcElwee) is a co-founder of Data for Progress (@DataProgress). Note: Thanks to Michael Podhorzer of AFL-CIO for inspiring this post and Jon Green for making sure I’m not an idiot (as usual). Data and code for regression analysis available here. |