1998-11-29 04:00:00 PDT VIETNAM; UNITED STATES -- Washington
NEW TAPES, released last week, cast a different light on the most fateful American action of the Vietnam war: the decision in August 1963 to dump Saigon's existing government, then led by President Ngo Dinh Diem, and replace it with a military junta more responsive to U.S. war aims. "The coup over the weekend culminated three months of division and discussion in Washington and Saigon," President John F. Kennedy dictates to himself on Nov. 4. He confesses the role America played in the weekend coup, his regret at Diem's death, his fears as to what would follow. "I was shocked by the death of Ngo Dinh Diem. He was an extraordinary character, while he became increasingly difficult in the last few months. The question now is whether the generals can stay together and build a stable government or whether public opinion will turn on Saigon." The tape confirms Kennedy's role in a decision many believe led to the Americanization of the Vietnam war. By eliminating the last Vietnamese leader with the legitimacy to tell us to leave that country, we lost the last leader with the legitimacy to ask us to stay. But at the time, in that last summer of his life, Jack Kennedy could see no alternative. Always sensitive to public opinion, he hated the TV and newspaper pictures of a U.S.-backed Catholic government brutally repressing that country's Buddhist majority. How could we defeat the Communist rebels in the jungles and rice fields of South Vietnam with an ally, President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was at war with his own people? Kennedy's fateful command was delivered Aug. 24, 1963, in a cable to his handpicked ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, approving the coup. "We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back," Lodge responded. "The overthrow of the Diem government." On Nov. 1, with the coup set in motion, a cold-blooded Lodge had breakfast with Diem, assuring him he had nothing to fear. Later, when an anguished Diem called for help, Lodge waffled, saying people were asleep back in Washington and he couldn't get a decision on what to do. The following morning, Diem and his brother Nhu were taken from a Catholic church, shot and stabbed to death. On the Nov. 4 tape, JFK placed blame for the episode on the divided counsel he was getting from his experts. He lists those backing the coup: Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman and George Ball of the State Department and National Security aide Michael Forestal. And those opposed: military aide Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and CIA chief John McCone. Yet he takes the final heat himself: "I feel that we must bear a good deal of responsibility for it, beginning with our cable of early August in which we suggested the coup. In my judgment, that wire was badly drafted. It would never have been sent on a Saturday. I should not have given my consent to it without a roundtable conference in which McNamara and Taylor could have presented their views. While we did redress that balance in a later wire, the first wire encouraged Lodge along a course to which he was in any case inclined." For decades, critics such as Richard Nixon would argue that Kennedy's decision to dump Diem had made the Vietnam War an American war.<
In this recording, made on the evening of Monday, November 4, 1963, less than three weeks before he himself would eventually be assassinated, Kennedy reflected upon the tumultuous events that had transpired in Saigon over the previous weekend, the overthrow and murder of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. While Kennedy was recording, his young children, John John (aged 3) and Caroline (aged 6), joined their father for a few moments. Download this lesson plan, including handouts, in pdf format. OverviewTopic: The Cold War; International Relations Subject Area: US History; World History Time Required: 50 minutes – 1 hour Goals/Rationale During the spring and summer of 1963, Americans were seeing images on television and in the newspapers of Buddhists protesting the harsh treatment they were receiving under the Diem government of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese government’s actions made it more difficult for the Kennedy Administration to continue its strong support of President Diem. The Kennedy Administration was in a tenuous position, trying to contain communism in Southeast Asia, but supporting an anti-Communist government that was not popular with a large number of its citizens and was guilty of acts objectionable to the American public. In this lesson, students will consider the language a president might use in trying to create the right balance in tone for both American and foreign audiences when discussing US involvement in other parts of the world. Essential Question How might a president address both domestic and foreign audiences in discussing a difficult situation abroad? Objectives Students will:
PreparationPrior Knowledge Students should have a working knowledge of the Cold War. They should be able to analyze primary sources. Historical Background and Context After World War II, the French tried to re-establish their colonial control over Vietnam, the most strategic of the three states comprising the former Indochina (Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos). Following the defeat of the French, Vietnam was partitioned by the Geneva Accord of 1954 into Communist North Vietnam and non-Communist South Vietnam, which was divided on religious and political lines. The United States supported a military government in the South and the decision of its leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, to prevent free elections which might result in the unification of the country under the control of the Communists. In an effort to take over South Vietnam, the Communist North supported attacks by guerrilla forces on the South. The Geneva Accords quickly began to crumble. American foreign policy after World War II had been based on the goal of containing Communism and the assumptions of the so-called "domino theory”—that if one country fell to Communism, the surrounding countries would fall, like dominoes. The Eisenhower administration was concerned that if Vietnam fell under Communist control, other Southeast Asian and Pacific nations, including even the Philippines, would fall one by one. In response to that threat, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed in 1955 to prevent Communist expansion. President Eisenhower sent some 700 military personnel as well military and economic aid to the government of South Vietnam. This effort was foundering when John F. Kennedy became president. In May 1961, JFK authorized sending an additional 500 Special Forces troops and military advisors to assist the pro‑Western government of South Vietnam. By the end of 1962, there were approximately 11,000 military advisors in South Vietnam. Internal corruption, divisiveness, and mounting successes by the Vietcong (Vietnamese Communists) guerrillas weakened the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem. In the spring of 1963, South Vietnamese forces suppressed Buddhist religious leaders and followers, which led to a political crisis for the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. The suppression of Buddhists in South Vietnam became known as the "Buddhist crisis." President Ngo Dinh Diem did little to ease the tensions, though he later promised reforms. Many people suspected that his brother and closest advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was the actual decision maker in the Saigon government and the person behind the Buddhist suppression. The Buddhist demonstrations continued throughout the spring and summer. When a Buddhist monk publicly set himself on fire in June, the photograph of the event made news around the world. President Kennedy tried to impress upon President Diem the need for major government reforms in Saigon, but Diem ignored the warnings. In August, Diem declared martial law and his forces raided the pagodas of the Buddhist group behind the protests. Soon after, South Vietnamese military officers contacted US government representatives and inquired about what a US response would be to a military coup in Saigon. On August 24, 1963, Cable 243 was sent to the US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and set the course for US support for a military coup. The cable stated that Diem needed to remove his brother from power and if he did not, “then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism.” After the cable was sent, President Kennedy and his advisors met several times to discuss the potential consequences of a coup in Vietnam and how the United States should react. The tape recorded meetings reveal President Kennedy's reservations about US support for a military coup in South Vietnam. A week after Cable 243 was sent, the South Vietnamese generals told Lodge that they were not ready to stage a coup. In early September, President Kennedy granted two television interviews. On September 2nd, he was interviewed by Walter Cronkite on the CBS network and on September 9th he was interviewed by David Brinkley and Chet Huntley on the NBC network. In both of these interviews, he was asked about South Vietnam. President Kennedy’s intended audience for his remarks was both US and foreign. The transcript of the Cronkite interview was sent to Ambassador Lodge with a note that it represented “the official US public position.” A few weeks later, President Kennedy sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor to South Vietnam to provide their assessment of the situation. In their public report, they noted progress on the military front but difficulties with the political situation. They commented that by the end of 1963, “the US program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 US military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.” On November 1, 1963, the South Vietnamese government was overthrown. President Diem, refusing an American offer of safety contingent upon his resignation, was assassinated. In the final weeks of his life, Kennedy wrestled with the need to decide the future of the United States’ commitment in Vietnam. There were approximately 16,000 military advisors in South Vietnam. Whether or not Kennedy would have increased military involvement in Vietnam or negotiated a withdrawal of military personnel still remains a hotly debated topic among historians and officials who served in the administrations of President Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson. Materials (All materials all included in the downloadable pdf.)
Procedure
AssessmentFor homework, have students write out their newspaper columns. Extension Provide students with the State Department’s American Opinion Summary dated September 10, 1963 which summarized opinions from various American newspapers on US policy in Vietnam. In what ways did news outlets react positively or negatively to JFK’s interviews? Connections to Curriculum (Standards)National History Standards - US History, Era 9: Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s)
Common Core State Standards
C3 Framework for Social Studies State Standards
National Council of Teachers of English: Standards 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 Massachusetts History and Social Science Framework
Massachusetts English Language Arts Framework
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What was kennedys reaction to the coup in south vietnam?
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