As there are many security risks associated with the use of email services, it is important that an organisation develops an email usage policy governing its use. Show
Control: ISM-0264; Revision: 3; Updated: Aug-19; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Webmail servicesWhen users access non-approved webmail services, they often bypass controls that have been implemented by an organisation, such as email content filtering. To mitigate this security risk, access to non-approved webmail services should be blocked. Control: ISM-0267; Revision: 7; Updated: Mar-19; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Protective markings for emailsImplementing protective markings for emails helps to prevent data spills, such as unauthorised data being released into the public domain. In doing so, it is important that protective markings reflect the highest sensitivity or classification of the subject, body and attachments of emails. Control: ISM-0270; Revision: 6; Updated: Jun-21; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Protective marking toolsRequiring user involvement in the protective marking of emails ensures a conscious decision is made by users, thereby lessening the chance of incorrect protective markings being applied to emails. In addition, allowing users to select only protective markings for which a system is authorised to process, store or communicate lessens the chance of users inadvertently over-classifying emails. Email content filters may only check the most recent protective marking applied to emails. Therefore, when users are responding to or forwarding emails, requiring protective markings which are at least as high as that of emails that are received will help email content filters prevent emails being sent to systems that are not authorised to handle their original sensitivity or classification. Control: ISM-0271; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-19; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-0272; Revision: 4; Updated: Mar-19; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1089; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Handling emails with inappropriate, invalid or missing protective markingsIt is important that email servers are configured to block emails with inappropriate protective markings. For example, blocking inbound and outbound emails with protective markings higher than the sensitivity or classification of the receiving system, as this will prevent a data spill from occurring. In doing so, it is important to inform the intended recipients of blocked inbound emails, and the senders of blocked outbound emails, that this has occurred. If emails are received with invalid or missing protective markings they may still be passed to their intended recipients. However, the recipients will have an obligation to determine appropriate protective markings if emails are to be responded to, forwarded or printed. If unsure, original senders of emails should be contacted to provide guidance on appropriate protective markings. Control: ISM-0565; Revision: 4; Updated: Mar-19; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1023; Revision: 6; Updated: Mar-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Email distribution listsIn some cases, the membership and nationality of members of email distribution lists will be unknown. As such, emails containing Australian Eyes Only, Australian Government Access Only or Releasable To data that are sent to email distribution lists could accidentally cause a data spill. Control: ISM-0269; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicability: S, TS; Essential Eight: N/A Further informationFurther information on the Australian Government’s email protective marking standard can be found in the Attorney-General’s Department’s Protective Security Policy Framework, Sensitive and classified information policy. Email gateways and serversCentralised email gatewaysWhen routing emails via centralised email gateways it will be easier for an organisation to deploy Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) and protective marking checks. Control: ISM-0569; Revision: 5; Updated: Jun-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-0571; Revision: 7; Updated: Jun-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Email gateway maintenance activitiesAs backup and alternative email gateways are often poorly maintained in terms of patches and email content filtering, an adversary will often seek to exploit this when sending malicious emails to an organisation. As such, it is important that backup and alternative email gateways are maintained at the same standard as an organisation’s primary email gateway. Control: ISM-0570; Revision: 4; Updated: Sep-18; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Open relay email serversAn open relay email server (or open mail relay) is an email server that is configured to allow anyone on the internet to send emails through it. Such configurations are highly undesirable as spammers and worms can exploit them. Control: ISM-0567; Revision: 5; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Email server transport encryptionEmails can be intercepted anywhere between originating email servers and destination email servers. Implementing opportunistic Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption can mitigate this security risk while ensuring email servers remain compatible with each other. However, opportunistic TLS encryption is susceptible to downgrade attacks. To mitigate this security risk, Mail Transfer Agent Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) allows domain owners to indicate that email transfers should only occur if satisfactory TLS encryption is negotiated beforehand. Implementing MTA-STS reduces the opportunity for downgrade attacks during email transfers, and provides visibility of when they are attempted. TLS reporting supports the implementation of MTA-STS by providing a mechanism for a domain owner to publish a location where reports can be submitted regarding the success or failure of attempts to initiate encrypted connections when sending emails to a specified domain. Control: ISM-0572; Revision: 4; Updated: Sep-21; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1589; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Sender Policy FrameworkSPF aids in the detection of spoofed emails by specifying a list of hosts or Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that are allowed to send emails on behalf of a specified domain or subdomain. If an email server is not in the SPF record for a domain or subdomain, SPF verification will not pass. In specifying SPF records, domain owners should ensure that they delegate the minimum necessary set of hosts or IP addresses necessary for sending emails. In addition, extra care should be taken when delegating to hosts or IP addresses not under an organisation’s control. Control: ISM-0574; Revision: 6; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1183; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1151; Revision: 3; Updated: Oct-19; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A DomainKeys Identified MailDKIM enables the detection of spoofed email contents. This is achieved by DKIM records specifying the public key used to verify the digital signature in an email. Specifically, if the signed digest in an email header does not match the signed contents of the email, verification will not pass. Control: ISM-0861; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1026; Revision: 5; Updated: Jan-20; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1027; Revision: 4; Updated: Sep-18; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and ConformanceDMARC enables a domain owner to specify what action receiving email servers should take as a result of domain alignment, SPF and DKIM checks. For emails that do not pass DMARC checks, this includes ‘reject’ (emails are rejected), ‘quarantine’ (emails are marked as spam) or ‘none’ (no action is taken). DMARC also provides a reporting feature which enables a domain owner to receive reports on the actions taken by receiving email servers. While this feature does not mitigate malicious emails sent to the domain owner’s organisation, it can give the domain owner some visibility of attempts by an adversary to spoof their organisation’s domains. Control: ISM-1540; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Control: ISM-1799; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Email content filteringContent filtering performed on email bodies and attachments provides a defence-in-depth approach to preventing malicious code being introduced into networks. Control: ISM-1234; Revision: 4; Updated: Mar-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Blocking suspicious emailsBlocking specific types of suspicious emails, such as where the email source address uses an internal domain, or internal subdomain, reduces the likelihood of phishing emails entering an organisation’s network. Control: ISM-1502; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Notifications of undeliverable emailsNotifications of undeliverable emails are commonly sent by receiving email servers when emails cannot be delivered, usually because destination addresses are invalid. Due to the common spamming practice of spoofing sender addresses, this often results in a large number of notifications of undeliverable emails being sent to innocent third parties. Sending notifications of undeliverable emails only to senders that can be verified via SPF, or other trusted means, avoids contributing to this problem while allowing legitimate senders to be notified. Control: ISM-1024; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Further informationFurther information on implementing opportunistic TLS encryption for email servers can be found in the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC)’s Implementing Certificates, TLS, HTTPS and Opportunistic TLS publication. Further information on implementing SPF, DKIM and DMARC can be found in the ACSC’s How to Combat Fake Emails publication. Further information on engaging the services of email service providers for marketing or filtering purposes can be found in the ACSC’s Marketing and Filtering Email Service Providers publication. Further information on email content filtering can be found in the content filtering section of the Guidelines for Gateways. Further information on email content filtering can be found in the ACSC’s Malicious Email Mitigation Strategies publication. Further information on email security can be found in the following National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publications: |