Politicians rewarding those who voted for them with jobs or special privileges was called

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Politicians rewarding those who voted for them with jobs or special privileges was called

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  • The Peelian Principles

Sir Robert Peel – Metropolitan Police of London – 1829

The Peelian principles summarize the ideas that Sir Robert Peel developed to define an ethical police force. The approach expressed in these principles is commonly known as policing by consent. In this model of policing, police officers are regarded as citizens in uniform. They exercise their powers to police their fellow citizens with the implicit consent of those fellow citizens. “Policing by consent” indicates that the legitimacy of policing in the eyes of the public is based upon a general consensus of support that follows from transparency about their powers, their integrity in exercising those powers and their accountability for doing so.

3 CORE IDEAS

  • The goal is preventing crime, not catching criminals. If the police stop crime before it happens, we don’t have to punish citizens or suppress their rights. An effective police department doesn’t have high arrest stats; its community has low crime rates.
  • The key to preventing crime is earning public support. Every community member must share the responsibility of preventing crime, as if they were all volunteer members of the force. They will only accept this responsibility if the community supports and trusts the police.
  • The police earn public support by respecting community principles. Winning public approval requires hard work to build reputation: enforcing the laws impartially, hiring officers who represent and understand the community, and using force only as a last resort.

9 Policing Principles

  1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
  2. To recognize always that the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behavior, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
  3. To recognize always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing cooperation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
  4. To recognize always that the extent to which the cooperation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
  5. To seek and preserve public favor, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humor, and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
  6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public cooperation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
  7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
  8. To recognize always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
  9. To recognize always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

Cronyism is the practice of partiality in awarding jobs and other advantages to friends or trusted colleagues, especially in politics and between politicians and supportive organizations.[1] For example, cronyism occurs when appointing "cronies" to positions of authority regardless of their qualifications.[2] This is in contrast to a meritocracy, in which appointments are made based on merit.

Politically, "cronyism" is derogatorily used to imply buying and selling favors, such as votes in legislative bodies, as doing favors to organizations, giving desirable ambassadorships to exotic places, etc.[3] Cronyism is a specific form of favoritism.[4]

The word "crony" first appeared in 17th-century London, according to the Oxford English Dictionary and is believed to be derived from the Greek word chronios (χρόνιος), meaning "long term".[5]

A less likely but oft-quoted source is the supposed Irish term Comh-Roghna, which translates as "close pals", or mutual friends.[citation needed]

Government officials are particularly susceptible to accusations of cronyism, as they spend taxpayers' money. Many democratic governments are encouraged to practice administrative transparency in accounting and contracting, however, there often is no clear delineation of when an appointment to government office is "cronyism".[6]

In the private sector, cronyism exists in organizations, often termed "the old boys' club" or "the golden circle"; again, the boundary between cronyism and "networking" is difficult to delineate.[7]

It is not unusual for a politician to surround themself with highly qualified subordinates, and to develop social, business, or political friendships leading to the appointment to office of friends, likewise in granting government contracts. In fact, the counsel of such friends is why the officeholder successfully obtained their powerful position; therefore, cronyism usually is easier to perceive than to demonstrate and prove.[citation needed][original research?][inconsistent] Politicians with representatives of business, other special interests, as unions and professional organizations get "crony-business" done in political agreements, especially by "reasonable" and lucrative honorariums to the politician for making speeches, or by legal donations to ones election campaign or to ones political party, etc.[citation needed][original research?]

Cronyism describes relationships existing among mutual acquaintances in private organizations where business, business information, and social interaction are exchanged among influential personnel. This is termed crony capitalism, and is an ethical breach of the principles of the market economy; in advanced economies, crony capitalism is a breach of market regulations.

Given crony capitalism's nature, these dishonest business practices are frequently (yet not exclusively) found in societies with ineffective legal systems. Consequently, there is an impetus upon the legislative branch of a government to ensure enforcement of the legal code capable of addressing and redressing private party manipulation of the economy by the involved businessmen and their government cronies.

The economic and social costs of cronyism are paid by society. Those costs are in the form of reduced business opportunity for the majority of the population, reduced competition in the market place, inflated consumer goods prices, decreased economic performance, inefficient business investment cycles, reduced motivation in affected organizations, and the diminution of economically productive activity.[7] A practical cost of cronyism manifests in the poor workmanship of public and private community projects.

Cronyism is self-perpetuating; cronyism then begets a culture of cronyism. This can only be apprehended by a comprehensive, effective, and enforced legal code, with empowered government agencies which can effect prosecutions in the courts.

Some instances[examples needed] of cronyism are readily transparent. With others,[examples needed] it is only in hindsight that the qualifications of the alleged "crony" must be evaluated. All appointments that are suspected of being cronyism are controversial. The appointed party may choose to either suppress disquiet or ignore it, depending upon the society's level of freedom of expression and individual personal liberty.

An example can be found in political activity in South Carolina, particularly in relation to Governor Henry McMaster, who initially gained his position after becoming the first high-level state official to endorse President Donald Trump and subsequently rose from lieutenant governor to governor of the state when President Trump appointed Nikki Haley to be the United States ambassador to the United Nations in November 2016.[8][9] On July 9, 2019, Governor McMaster would then go on to attempt to force a vote for the President of the University of South Carolina ahead of schedule and for the benefit of his favorite candidate, Robert Caslen Jr., former superintendent of West Point Academy who was favored by President Trump and previously interviewed by the Trump administration for the position of National Security Advisor.[10][11] Less than two weeks later, in spite of protestation from a majority of the student body, alumni, and major donors, the vote was cast in favor of Caslen on July 19, 2019.[12]

The Russian president Vladimir Putin is alleged to be the "head of the clan",[13] whose assets are estimated at $200 billion.[14][15] A list of Russian and Ukrainian politicians associated with "kleptocratic style" has been published by the Kleptocracy Archives project.[16]

U.S. President Donald Trump assigned at least five members of his private golf clubs to choice government jobs such as ambassadorships. This is the first time in modern history that a president has rewarded people with jobs that paid money to his own companies.[17]

The nominations of Prime Minister Boris Johnson for the House of Lords were selected based on their support for his version of Brexit, rather than ability or service to the public as is customary (for instance, the previous Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow did not receive a nomination due to Johnson's perception that he worked against him for getting key Brexit votes through).[18] The process for procurement of government contracts in light of[colloquialism] the COVID-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom has been criticised by some as a "chumocracy" (cronyism).[19][20][21]

India: High command culture

In India, it has been seen that the chiefs of national political parties directly appoint their close aides as the regional subordinates rather than through the party's internal elections—thus undermining the autonomy of the state units.[22] The culture was first seen under the premiership of Indira Gandhi,[23][24] then under her successor Sonia Gandhi,[25] and now under the Bharatiya Janata Party's Modi government.[26][27] Over the years, several chief ministers of wide range of parties have been appointed likewise.[28][29][30] Before the independence of India, Mahatma Gandhi could override most decisions of the Indian National Congress, regardless of his on-paper status in the party.

  • 2006-2007 Life Peerages scandal
  • Cartel
  • Collective narcissism
  • Conflict of interest
  • Crony capitalism
  • Crony-capitalism index
  • In-group favoritism
  • Interest group
  • Logrolling
  • Meritocracy
  • Nepotism
  • Oligarchy
  • Political corruption
  • Price fixing
  • Spoils system
  • Wasta

  1. ^ "cronyism American English definition and synonyms - Macmillan Dictionary".
  2. ^ "the definition of cronyism".
  3. ^ Daniel Garza (March 12, 2012). "Government Cronyism is Back". Archived from the original on 8 March 2015. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
  4. ^ Judy Nadler and Miriam Schulman. "Favoritism, Cronyism, and Nepotism". Santa Clara University. Retrieved 20 June 2013.
  5. ^ "Oxford Dictionaries - Dictionary, Thesaurus, & Grammar". Retrieved 2 July 2015.[dead link]
  6. ^ https://www.ced.org/cronycapitalism CED.com, official website of The Committee for Economic Development (CED), "Crony Capitalism: Unhealthy Relations Between Business and Government"
  7. ^ a b Staff (2010). "Do Old Boys' Clubs Make The Market More Efficient?". The Free Marketeers. Retrieved 26 April 2012.
  8. ^ Delreal, Jose (January 7, 2016). "Trump picks up endorsement from S.C. Lt. Gov. Henry McMaster". The Washington Post. Retrieved July 9, 2019.
  9. ^ "Trump names Nikki Haley as UN ambassador". BBC. November 23, 2016. Retrieved July 9, 2016.
  10. ^ Lucy, Catherine (February 18, 2017). "Trump interviewing McMaster, West Point superintendent Caslen and others for security job". Military Times. Retrieved July 9, 2019.
  11. ^ Daprile, Lucas (July 9, 2019). "McMaster forces vote on controversial USC presidential finalist while students are away". The State. Retrieved July 9, 2019.
  12. ^ "Robert Caslen picked as new University of South Carolina president". WLTX19. 19 July 2019. Retrieved July 19, 2019.
  13. ^ Luke Harding (December 2010). "WikiLeaks cables condemn Russia as 'mafia state'". The Guardian.
  14. ^ "Putin's judo cronies put lock on billions in riches - The Sunday Times". thesundaytimes.co.uk. Archived from the original on March 2, 2014.
  15. ^ Dawisha, Karen (2014). Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 9781476795195.
  16. ^ "Individuals – Kleptocracy Archive". kleptocracyarchive.org. Archived from the original on 2016-05-18. Retrieved 2016-05-22.
  17. ^ Schouten, Frank, et al
  18. ^ "Cronyism at work as Johnson packs the Lords | Letters". TheGuardian.com. 3 August 2020.
  19. ^ Pogrund, Gabriel; Calver, Tom (15 November 2020). "Chumocracy first in line as ministers splash Covid cash". The Sunday Times. Retrieved 15 November 2020.
  20. ^ Conn, David; Pegg, David; Evans, Rob; Garside, Juliette; Lawrence, Felicity (15 November 2020). "'Chumocracy': how Covid revealed the new shape of the Tory establishment". The Observer. Retrieved 15 November 2020.
  21. ^ "Boris Johnson's profligacy problem". The Economist. 14 November 2020. Retrieved 14 November 2020.
  22. ^ Ghosh, Ambar Kumar. "The growing high command culture: A challenge for inner-party democracy in India". ORF. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  23. ^ Ghosh, Ambar Kumar. "The growing high command culture: A challenge for inner-party democracy in India". ORF. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  24. ^ "How high command culture has undermined federalism". The News Minute. 2021-10-07. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  25. ^ "The 'High Command' Culture Destroying Congress, Can Sonia Gandhi Really Become A Success Story? | Outlook India Magazine". www.outlookindia.com/. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  26. ^ "BJP must refrain from being a 'High Command' led Party". Times of India Blog. 2021-07-19. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  27. ^ Venkataramakrishnan, Rohan. "The Political Fix: Is Modi's High Command culture turning some BJP CMs into glorified bureaucrats?". Scroll.in. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  28. ^ "The high command: Triggering new lows for decades". Deccan Herald. 2021-08-08. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  29. ^ "Frequent change of CMs in BJP-ruled states signs of growing high command culture". The New Indian Express. Retrieved 2021-11-05.
  30. ^ "Congress high command will decide on CM face for Karnataka, says Siddaramaiah". Hindustan Times. 2021-10-18. Retrieved 2021-11-05.

  • Begley, Thomas M.; Khatri, Naresh; Tsang, Eric W. K. (2010). "Networks and cronyism: A social exchange analysis". Asia Pacific Journal of Management. 27 (2): 281–297. doi:10.1007/s10490-009-9137-4. S2CID 143799762.
  • Bryce, Robert (2004). Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America's Superstate. PublicAffairs. ISBN 9781586481889. LCCN 2003070694.
  • Khatri, Naresh; Tsang, Eric W. K.; Begley, Thomas M. (2006). "Cronyism: A Cross-Cultural Analysis". Journal of International Business Studies. 37 (1): 61–75. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400171. JSTOR 3875215. S2CID 18930227.
    [Also in T. G. Andrews and R. Mead (Eds.), Cross Cultural Management, Volume 2 -The Impact of Culture 1: 126–150. Routledge, UK.]
  • Khatri, Naresh; Tsang, Eric W. K.; Begley, Thomas M. (2003). "Cronyism: The Downside of Social Networking". Academy of Management Proceedings. 2003: C1–C6. doi:10.5465/ambpp.2003.13792813.
  • Khatri, Naresh; Tsang, Eric W. K. (2003). "Antecedents and Consequences of Cronyism in Organizations". Journal of Business Ethics. 43 (4): 289–303. doi:10.1023/A:1023081629529. S2CID 142479179.
  • Diwan, Ishac; Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim (2021). "Political Connections Reduce Job Creation: Firm-level Evidence from Lebanon". Journal of Development Studies. 57 (8): 1373–1396. doi:10.1080/00220388.2020.1849622. S2CID 229717871.

  • "Favoritism, Cronyism, and Nepotism". Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Santa Clara University.
  • SuperNews: Hurricane Katrina - A political flash cartoon about the cronyism surrounding Michael D. Brown and Hurricane Katrina.

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